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**THE NEW "PPBS":
PORK, POLITICS BUDGETS AND STRATEGY
AND THE ACTIVE AND RESERVE
COMPONENTS IN THE US MILITARY**

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INTRODUCTION--NEW REALITIES

Americans' images of the armed forces are sadly out of date and ill informed among both the public and political decision makers in many quarters. Our image of the American military dates from the Cold War and the Gulf War, not the realities of the present and the post Gulf War world. We think we are bigger and stronger than we are, despite the frequent news stories about cuts in defense and the defense industrial base. Juxtaposed against rhetoric about being "the world's only superpower" and global deployments and missions to such far flung places as the Gulf, Haiti, Somalia and Macedonia, it is not difficult to see why the image of great power and capability persist. While we may have a defense budget nearly as large as the reported defense budgets of most of the rest of the world combined, what that budget buys, how we are organized to "provide for the common defense," and our ability to sustain combat of any size or duration in one, let alone two, simultaneous regional contingencies, is suspect at best.

The US military establishment consists of an active duty Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy and Coast Guard and their reserve and guard components. There are reserve components of each of the services. In addition, there are National Guard and Air National Guard units, under command of the state governors and their adjutant generals. The Guard is the older of the forces--indeed, "older than the active army itself"-- with the reserves "a twentieth century creation of the regulars, who sought a counterweight to the political power of the National Guard."¹ The total strength of the US armed services in FY 94 was 3,469,244 (less retired reserves and civilians) and is divided as follows:

<u>Service</u>	<u>Active Duty</u>	<u>Nat Guard</u>	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>IRR/ING²</u>
Army	33.7%	24.2%	16.3%	25.8%
Navy	60.4%	-----	14.5%	25.1%
Air Force	58.9%	15.5%	10.7%	14.9%
Marine Corps	61.6%	-----	14.4%	24.0%
Coast Guard	69.0%	-----	16.6%	14.4%

Increasingly, the bulk of the personnel and much of the equipment of the uniformed armed services of the United States are in the Guard and Reserve forces, the so-called "weekend warriors" who train one weekend a month and serve two weeks on active duty every summer. They are supposedly part of a "Total Force Policy" which seeks to integrate all components of the armed forces--active as well as guard and reserve--into a comprehensive military system to provide for the common defense. Alas, the Total Force Policy may be a modern day equivalent of the Holy Roman Empire. The latter was described as being neither Holy, Roman nor an Empire and the former is not total, is of questionable force and is less policy than a patchwork quilt arrangement

reflecting the lowest common denominator of agreement among the states, Congress, active duty forces and the reserve and guard units and their lobby groups.

Downsizing Personnel & Equipment in the Active Forces

The American military has shrunk drastically in the last ten years--in manpower, hardware and budget. It is also drastically reshaped and reorganized. Ten years ago, we were near the peak of the Reagan defense build-up and the height of Cold War rhetoric. We have gone from planning for a 600 ship Navy and 40 fighter wings for the Air Force to roughly half of those numbers in each service. The bulk of the manpower for the US Army, most of the planes for the US Air Force and many of the ships owned by the Navy are all in Guard and Reserve units, not the active forces. The US would be hard pressed to deploy a large force abroad, sustain it for long in the field or employ it in combat without reliance on Guard and Reserve forces. In short, the US cannot go to war without using the Guard and Reserves. How and why this is so will be examined later.

Yet, despite this reality, the active forces consider themselves to be the professionals with the Guard and Reserve members being amateurs. They are seen as poor relations--and treated as such--personally, professionally, financially and operationally in many instances. What has kept Guard and Reserve components strong and forceful, at least politically, has more to do with strong lobby groups, Congressional pork, budgetary considerations and state and local politics and less to do with national security strategy and national military policy. Suffice it to say, the nature of the American military has been drastically transformed to conform, we hope, to the changing strategic threats occasioned by the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. After examining some of these realities in detail below, I will conclude by arguing that the "Total Force Policy," announced by Defense Secretary Laird in 1973 is in need of review, and revision if the nation is to be able to rely on its armed services for the missions it seeks to have them perform both in peace and war.

As a consequence of this adjustment in the nature of the American military, an increasing portion of the manpower, materiel and budgets are flowing to the Guard and Reserve forces. The active forces grudgingly give new equipment to the guard and reserve components rather than scrap it as active duty units are drawn down. Congress sees guard and reserve forces as cheaper and more politically useful and supports these transfers and even mandates them. Despite being under the control of the state governors, National Guard and Air National Guard units are receiving some very modern strategic equipment. The Governor of Georgia will have under his control one of the world's more modern strategic air forces when 20 B1-B bombers become operational for the Georgia Air National Guard in 1997. Even if the defense budget remains constant instead of declining, the pressures caused by this shift in the American military establishment will cause problems for future planners and those entrusted with the nation's security.

The Size and Nature of the Guard and Reserve

In that the US Army has the bulk of the manpower, the bulk of its personnel are in the guard and reserve. Hence, what neither the public nor many political decision makers understand, and what many active duty military try and ignore, is that the majority of the uniformed armed forces of the United States are in the Guard and Reserve, not active duty forces. Furthermore, a great many of the assets--manpower, skills, equipment and materiel--that the US military needs for long term or large overseas deployment, whether they be in support of operations other than war or in actual conflict, a "major regional contingency," are in the Guard and Reserve. The missions we may give our military in many cases cannot be accomplished without calling up Guard and Reserve forces.

Some illustrations to support these assertions follow. 100% of the US Army's Chemical Brigades, Water Supply Battalions, Judge Advocate General Units and Public Affairs Units are in the guard and reserve components. So too are 97% of all the Civil Affairs units, 86% of its Medical Brigades, 77% of its Maintenance Battalions, along with 62% of its Field Artillery Battalions, 55% of its Medium Helicopter Battalions and 50% of its Infantry Divisions. In the Air Force, 100% of its Weather Reconnaissance aircraft, Strategic Interceptor Force, and Tactical Reconnaissance aircraft are in the guard and reserve components. 65% of its Tactical Airlift, 54% of its Aerial Refueling/Strategic Tanker force, 45% of its Tactical Air Support and 40% of its Tactical Fighters are also in guard and reserve component units.

While the Marine Corps, being the "911" force of the American military is not as dependent on reserve support, it still has 50% of its Tank Battalions, Force Reconnaissance Companies, and Light Anti-Aircraft Missile Companies and 40% of its Reconnaissance Platoons in the Marine Corps Reserves. The Navy has less reliance on Reserve personnel but in event of war would have to get most of its cargo hauling shipping capability from the fleet reserve and the chartering of privately owned cargo ships, most not American owned nor registered. Nearly 40% of the Special Operations Forces of the US military are in guard and reserve units.³

OOTW and "Mission Creep" for the Guard and Reserve

"Weekend warriors" or not, nearly 100,000 personnel from the guard and reserve were deployed overseas at some time in 1994 for Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW).⁴ These missions--from PROVIDE COMFORT and SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq to DENY FLIGHT and PROVIDE PROMISE in Bosnia and SHARP GUARD in the Adriatic off the coast of Yugoslavia and SUPPORT/UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. In addition, they were involved in Military Liaison Teams throughout Eastern Europe and the republics of the former Soviet Union. They participated in the Multinational Force and Observers peacekeeping operations in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt. They were involved, along with the Coast Guard Reserve in the sea rescue, care and feeding and return of both Cuban and Haitian refugees, operations ABLE VIGIL and ABLE MANNER respectively. In several cases, without Guard and Reserve forces, particularly for the Air Force, the regular forces simply could not have performed the missions demanded and met training requirements and maintenance schedules as well.⁵

In addition, guard and reserve forces are involved in a variety of domestic missions. The Guard in particular is involved in disaster relief missions and is called to active duty for everything from civil disturbances and prevention of looting in urban areas to hurricane evacuation and clean-up in the South and fighting forest fires in the Pacific Northwest. Their domestic duties have involved aiding the border patrols of the US Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization Service in the Southwest to working in counter drug operations in Latin America, the Gulf of Mexico and in the US. The scope and scale of these operations continues to grow and places increased demands on reserve component forces. The National Guard has become involved in counter drug operations. From 1984 to 1989, the number of state and territorial Guard units involved in these operations increased from 14 to 53. There were involved in that period in over 3,000 counter drug support missions. From 1990 to 1994, one additional territory participated but the number of missions climbed to over 30,000--a ten fold increase.⁶

Still other domestic activities of a different nature are also part of reserve component force missions. These include civil-military cooperation in such programs as STARBASE, ChalleNGe, Seaborne Conservation Corps and GALILEO.⁷ Everything from elementary and secondary school science and engineering training and education, anti-drug education programs, band concerts in public schools, leadership and citizenship training programs for teenagers, medical clinics in underserved rural areas of the country, immunization programs, tutorial services and adopt a school programs, building artificial reefs offshore with unusable equipment, and a host of other activities of a social action variety are equally part of the guard and reserve missions. For many in the country, their only contact with the military comes through these sorts of activities or Memorial Day of July 4th celebrations and parades. To many, the military is the guard and reserve.

THE NEW "PPBS"

What I call the "new PPBS" is in some cases not new, but comes to have significant impact on our defense establishment the results of which will be novel. The "new PPBS" stands for "Pork, Politics, Budgets and Strategy." It is an acronym for the cluster of problems that loom on the horizon for the US military and the political leadership of both Congress and the Executive branch. Unless we can overcome some of our current habits, we will diminish the nation's defense capability and security, not enhance it. There has always been disagreement and rivalry, partisan and parochial, over the defense budget and probably always will. But the dangers in the process, the likelihood of a potentially fatal disconnect in policy making and procurement, and the difficulty in crafting an effective national military strategy are all greater now than they have been in the past.

The circumstances are not entirely novel but it has been nearly two generations since the Guard and Reserve out numbered the active duty forces in the 1930s. The history of the Guard and Reserve forces and the roles they have played in providing for the common defense have been examined by many others.⁸ Pork and politics have come

with the territory but not on the scale that may prove to be the case in the near future. A combination of events--budgetary pressures, reorganization of the military, base closures, more peacetime OOTW missions, increased global demands on a much smaller professional volunteer force, environmental clean-up costs, and the usual interwar competition between readiness and modernization--mean that the business as usual is aggravated still further.

PORK

Unrequested Budgeting

That Congress as a whole and individual members as well have meddled in the defense procurement budget is neither novel nor particularly newsworthy. That they have done so in regard to both the active and reserve components of the uniformed military is also a common practice of long standing. Building an Army National Guard Armory in one's district was a visible sign of federal funds flowing to the community. So too was establishing a Naval Reserve Center or some other facility dedicated to the Guard and Reserve components of the US military. The amounts of money on a case by case basis and the impact on strategy were small. It was routine. But we now have a set of circumstances that in the aggregate are very large.

The Army National Guard has 3,132 armories and other facilities for its training and administration. The Air National Guard has over 1300 aircraft. The Army Reserves have nearly 3,500 separate units and the Navy Reserves nearly 2,800.⁹ All clamor for Congressional support and get large amounts of it. Despite the Base Realignment and Closure Commission's activities in closing and relocating military bases, both active duty and guard and reserve, there are over 5,400 guard and reserve facilities in over 4,200 communities comprising nearly 33,000 buildings and structures worth an estimated \$36 billion.¹⁰ The Guard and Reserves are big business and get over 11% of the DOD budget--over \$20 billion.¹¹ Troublesome though that may be, more serious problems are upon us.

Reserve forces pork has reached the big time. The trend started with the Reagan defense buildup and has been escalating for the last 15 years. Even given the concern for budget cutting and deficit reduction, it continues seemingly unabated. The Pentagon has become so used to Congress putting items in the budget for guard and reserve forces that it no longer bothers to make requests for reserve equipment. The circle of retired military groups and individuals, defense contractors and individual Congressmen will see to it that a whole host of unrequested equipment gets in the final defense appropriations.

A Competition in Aircraft and Political Clout

A recent political brouhaha involving the major leadership of the House and Senate will illustrate the point. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich (R, Ga.) wrote to Secretary of Defense William Perry urging the appropriation of \$501 million be devoted to the purchase of Lockheed Hercules C-130s made in Marietta, GA for the US Air Force

Guard and Reserve units. Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole (R, Kan.) wrote three weeks later urging the funds be spent on C-12 turbo-prop passenger planes for the Army Reserve, made in Wichita, Kansas. The two senators from Connecticut, Dodd and Lieberman, sought the funds for Connecticut-made Blackhawk helicopters for the Army National Guard while sixteen House members urged spending the funds for Cobra helicopters for the Marine Corps Reserves.¹²

Did the various reserve units need these items and who had the greatest need? DOD had not even requested the more than half a billion dollars. The units themselves are less short of airplanes and helicopters than they are of ground equipment and such things as communications gear, power supply units, night vision goggles and trucks. But these are not as big, pricey nor as splashy for photo opportunities and news coverage as larger and more expensive aircraft and helicopters. Aircraft were going to be purchased whether they were needed or not and regardless of what other priorities might exist.

Despite the fact that the US military has nearly 100 more C-130 Hercules than the 388 called for in the national war plan, they will get 8 more in the budget for FY '96 costing some \$290.4 million. Lobbyists working for Lockheed, including two retired three star generals who headed the National Guard Bureau, Lavern Weber and John Conaway, the National Guard Association, Senate Majority Whip Trent Lott (R-Miss.) and Senator Robert Byrd (D-W. Va.) successfully forced Pentagon Comptroller John Hamre to keep 8 C-130s in the budget (they had wanted 18) giving two more to the Air National Guard than he had wanted.. Hamre, bowing to pressure and relative political clout, kept the 14 C-12s that Dole had pressed hard for to the Army Reserves. But he cut the numbers of Black Hawks for the Army National Guard from 12 to 8 and the number of Cobras for the Marine Reserves from 7 to 4.

The Defense Committee of the Whole

What this illustrates is the way in which individual Congressmen and Senators are making national military policy based on narrow parochial and partisan concerns for their districts and manufacturers. In effect, at least in regard to reserve equipment, we have a defense committee of 535 who fight out what appropriations are to be made based on political power and IOUs with no regard to requests from the military or the common defense of the nation. The long term consequences of this lack of vision, institutionalized corruption and defense policy by log-rolling is certainly unaffordable now, if it ever was, and represents a serious flaw in the way we do business in providing for the nation's defense. As the Guard and Reserve's role continues to grow relative to the size of the active forces, such tensions will only be exacerbated.

In fiscal years 1989-1994, over \$4.5 billion was appropriated for guard and reserve facilities. Nearly half that amount--\$2.2 billion--was Congressional add on over and above DOD requests.¹³ Of the total military construction budget for guard and reserves in the 1995 military construction (MILCON) appropriation of \$188 million, fully \$178 million for 61 different projects was accounted for by Congressional add-ons to the

budget request.¹⁴ And it is likely to get worse before it gets better. The Reserve Forces Policy Board estimates that "almost half of Army Reserve facilities are presently inadequate in meeting training, storage and maintenance needs."¹⁵ There is a backlog of military construction for the guard and reserve amounting to \$7.4 billion in FY 94.¹⁶

The stage is being set for an even more aggressive budget expansion for reserve and guard installations. To meet the needs of the services' guard and reserve components, an investment strategy of nearly a billion dollars a year is required. This amount is never met and the problem gets worse annually. Even so, however, Congressional add-ons account for an additional amount at least equal to the budget request and generally more than twice what was budgeted, adding over \$400 million a year each of the last three years.¹⁷ Then too, there are the environmental clean-up costs estimated at more than \$1.2 billion and being funded at about \$175 million per year. The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is actually increasing operations and maintenance (O & M) costs and giving rise to even greater pressure for more funds expended in Congressional districts for guard and reserve components. Conservatively estimated, there is something on the order of \$1.5 billion a year for Congress to fight over in Congressional pork for guard and reserve forces without any increased need.

POLITICS

The Size and Location of the Guard and Reserve Communities

The politics of these issues are not to be taken lightly. The reserve component forces consisting of the National Guard, comprised of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, and the reserves for each of the services (Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines) are forces to be reckoned with, as are their retired members. The latter are arrayed in a number of organizations and lobby groups, principally, the Retired Officer Association (ROA) with 102,000 members, the Naval Reserve Association with 25,000 members, a Naval Enlisted Reserve Association with over 15,500 members, a Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association with over 6,000 members and an Army Reserve Association just started in 1992.¹⁸ Thus there are about 150,000 retired members of reserve associations nationwide. These can be counted on to help their still active brethren in both the National Guard and the Reserves who number roughly 1,800,000, including the Individual Ready Reserve and Inactive National Guard contingents. A well disciplined and motivated group of nearly 2,000,000--most being paid for active training and or military retirement benefits and COLAs, and in many cases both, makes for a very effective lobby organization.

In many areas of the country, the National Guard, both Army and Air Force, may be more numerous than Boy Scout troops. There are 3,606 National Guard units in the US and three territories who have over 500,000 members and some 88,090 permanent civil service technicians (full time employees supporting the Guard) as well.¹⁹ An extreme example for its size, Alabama, though it has only 67 counties, has 151 National Guard units with nearly 21,000 personnel assigned.²⁰ (There are more than 20 additional

Reserve installations as well.) These guard units are organized under a structure headed by the Adjutant General of the state contingent of the National Guard who works with both his Army and Air Force Guard Commanders and closely with the state's governor, the Commander in Chief of all of the state's Guard units unless they are called to federal service. They constitute a powerful lobby both within the states and in Washington in support of Guard construction, equipment, training and manning levels.

Roles and Missions of the Guard and Reserve

The Reserves are a separate category of reserve component forces still under the jurisdiction of their individual services but serving only as part-time soldiers--one weekend a month and two weeks in the summer. This normal model of reserve obligation for the so-called "week-end warriors" has been sorely tested of late. As more and more equipment and personnel have been transferred to the reserves as the active duty forces were drawn down, greater use has been made of reserve units, equipment and personnel for a variety of missions from counter drug operations to peacekeeping, sanctions monitoring and war itself. The extended roles and missions of the reserve and guard forces are complex but important aspects of the transformed American military of the 1990s. The citizen soldier is being called upon with greater frequency and his active duty brethren simply cannot go to war without him. This is particularly true for the Army and is the outgrowth of the Vietnam War.

General Creighton Abrams, Chief of Staff of the US Army after Vietnam, vowed that America would never again fight a war of any size or duration without calling up the reserves in part to test support of the populace for it and in part so that a trained pool of manpower would be integrated with the active forces when the need arose.²¹ He sought no legislation from Congress nor Executive Order from the President but set about reorganizing the US Army so that it would simply be impossible to fight for long or in a serious engagement with calling to active duty personnel and equipment in the Guard and Reserve. Much of the combat support and large amounts of the combat service support units were placed in the reserves and guard. (more will be said of this below). The reality is that as of about 1990, more than half of the uniformed members of the US Army were in the National Guard and Army Reserves. More important than the 53% of the US Army in the reserve component forces was the types of units located there instead of with the active forces. There will be more on this later.

Co-dependency: Making a Virtue of Necessity

The active duty forces and the guard and reserve are inextricably linked with each other. The US military cannot go very far, stay very long or fight very well without the use of guard and reserve forces. Most of the Air Forces tankers and cargo fleet are in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserves. Deployment as well as sustainment by air become major missions which the regular forces cannot do on any major scale or continue for long. The Army has half its infantry divisions in the guard and reserves and much of its combat support and combat service support units. Two major near

simultaneous regional contingencies are difficult with the guard and reserve and one cannot be done without them. The Navy has all its Logistics Support Squadrons and Heavy Logistics Support Units in the reserve and the Coast Guard has all its port Security Units in the reserve as well. Any major overseas deployment would require these--and other units such as frigates for convoy duty and cargo ships in the Fleet Reserve--to be mobilized quickly.²²

In the Gulf War, DESERT SHIELD could not have occurred as quickly as it did without more than 10,000 volunteers in the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserves flying tankers and cargo planes before the President's call up of reserve and guard units to active duty. In all, over 225,000 reservists were called to active duty during the build up to and the prosecution of the Gulf War.²³ There were problems and different assessments about readiness, mobilization time and performance depending on whether one is considered units or individuals and the Army's "roundout brigade" concept was deemed a failure. Furthermore, the rolling, incremental nature of the call-up over six months may be a luxury we cannot afford in the future. But despite these caveats, the overall assessment of both the availability of reserve forces and their overall effectiveness in the Gulf War was positive.²⁴

BUDGETS

The Real Cost of a War and a Military Establishment

Whatever the cost of the Gulf War, and the estimates range from approximately \$50 billion to \$100 billion,²⁵ its real costs will be much higher. This is because the real time costs are likely to be only one third of the actual expenditures. These go on for decades and are comprised of the health care, retirement and survivor benefits paid to the veterans of the conflict. In fact, the ratio of real time costs to deferred costs is something on the order of 1 to 3. To illustrate the point, in the year the US mobilized to fight Saddam Hussein in the Gulf in 1990, the US government mailed survivor benefit checks to 51 individuals whose claims were based on relatives who served during the US Civil War.²⁶ Hence the cost of the Gulf War is likely to be triple the real time costs incurred.

So too with the costs of a guard and reserve system in which the retirement benefits, costs of living allowances, medical care and health insurance, educational and other benefits far outlast the 20 year career necessary to obtain them. Many live an additional 20 years after the age when they may start to draw retirement benefits. In addition to medical and dental coverage and retirement benefits, there are educational benefits, greatly expanded under the Montgomery GI Bill, vocational benefits and loan guarantees available to eligible members of the guard and reserve.²⁷ We have a reserve and guard establishment with over 1,000,000 members in active units and full time support who will be collecting benefits well after their service ends. This is not meant to disparage their contribution to the nation's security in any way but merely to point out that the cost of the system, both active and reserve, is far greater than the way we usually assess them.

The "Non-Defense" Defense Budget

Most Americans think that the Defense Budget pays for providing for the nation's defense. They expect that it buys weapons systems, ammunition, support materials, military pay and allowances and the like. Few realize that it has become a dumping ground for all sorts of what we might call "trendy," as opposed to "traditional," pork. A great many expenditures cannot be related to national defense in any way whatsoever. Nevertheless, they are part of the defense budget.. These expenditures include a wide variety of programs of all sorts which find their way into the defense budget for a variety of political expedients.

The defense budget has come to include such items as funding for World Cup Soccer (\$15 million), the Summer Olympics (\$7 million), medical research on Lyme Disease (\$850,000), breast cancer (\$215 million) and prostate cancer (\$6 million) among a great many other projects that by any rational test are non-defense related.²⁸ While each of these is relatively small in comparison to the size of the total Defense budget, when added together, they become significant and the trend in growth is alarming. And why, pray tell, do we engage in such obvious chicanery to begin with? Many will willingly support a strong national defense but not a budget that is increasingly abused this way.

In FY1990, non defense expenditures in the DOD Budget were roughly \$3.1 billion.²⁹ By 1994, they had grown to \$12.7 billion the fiscal 1995 Defense Budget contained roughly \$12 billion in non-defense spending. That amount of money spent on either readiness or modernization, or a combination of both, would have significant impact. on the national defense capabilities of our armed forces. Spent as they are, it only confirms the funding of social programs by other means.

The DOD Budget as a Raidable Asset

As if this weren't enough, the Clinton Administration has engaged in a habit of having the DOD budget fund other government agencies. The 1995 Defense Authorization Bill contained allocations for the Department of Justice (\$25 million), the Small Business Administration (\$50 million), the Farmers Home Administration (\$43 million), and an estimated \$300 million distributed among the Commerce, Energy and Transportation Departments, NASA and the National Science Foundation. At the same time environmental clean-up costs have jumped from \$1.6 billion in 1990 to almost \$6 billion in 1995.³⁰

Even members of Congress get exasperated with their colleagues over the pork, politics and budget mess they themselves have created. Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) berated his colleagues for having the House add \$731 million in unrequested military construction, the Senate a mere \$718, only to have the conference committee decide on \$987 million in unrequested projects. That means Congress is adding about \$1 billion per year for member's pet projects in their districts that are not requested and this not for

procurement, but only military construction. McCain noted further that another \$100 million was added for 30 more armories and 4 additional reserve centers. The real kicker, as McCain pointed out is the following. If you look at where the money goes, 29% of the Senate got 66% of the additional dollars and 14% of the House got 72% of the added dollars. And, these just happened to correspond with membership on the Armed Services Committees.³¹

The implications are several. First, the Defense Budget really isn't the Defense Budget. It is merely the largest pot of annual expenditure that can be raided for other purposes. Secondly, whether it grows, remains stable or declines, the amount spent on defense is really not being spent on defense. It must be discounted by a considerable amount. Third, even then, whatever the budget request represents is not what will be spent after Congress adds its pork, both for defense and non-defense items. Is Jr. ROTC in inner city high schools a part of national defense? Yes and no, but it is not traditionally seen as a military expenditure which is what the public thinks the defense budget is. In previous eras, the military was the employer of last resort for many. It now appears to be the budget of first resort for Congress.

STRATEGY

Efforts to Restructure and Reduce the Force

There have been a number of reviews of US national security strategy and national military structure in the last five years and the budget and force structure required to support them. Each purported to reassess the US military based on changing world condition, likely threats and the response capability desired to meet probable contingencies. None forecast the nature of current operations, the extent and scale of OOTW and the impact on the military in the future. These were politically motivated and carefully crafted reviews which have ignored many of the tough questions central to the size and capability of the nation's armed forces.

The Base Force emerged under Chairman of the JCS Colin Powell as the first answer to "How Much Is Enough?" in light of the end of the Cold War. It was obvious that there would be significant cuts in manpower, procurement, and operational bases and units. The Base Force provided the rationale for the FY 92 defense budget and the 1993-1997 defense program. The Pentagon proposed a cut of 17% in the active forces and 19% cut in the reserves beginning with a cut of 106,000 in FY 92. Congress, though initially receptive, was inundated with letters from Guardsmen and reservists and initial cuts were about one third of those proposed. In FY 93, despite having a budget in which the active forces would be cut by 13% and the reserves would be 16% larger in fiscal 1993 than in fiscal 1980,³² Congress restored over 40,000 Guard positions and nearly 20,000 more reserve positions than the Pentagon sought to fund.³³

The effort to craft national security strategy and national military strategy in the context of a Total Force Policy is difficult if not impossible under such circumstances.

Congress represents a "wild card" in the crafting of each as it seeks to adjust military force levels, procurement and construction for partisan reasons. While many can rail against a "military-industrial complex," Congress is the key to how that game is played for it votes on the appropriations. If something as basic and fundamental as the size of the armed forces and the ratio of active to reserve forces cannot be agreed upon in advance with any accuracy, how can the more complicated aspects of the nation's defense be crafted effectively?

The Myth of the Total Force

The Total Force Policy in which the Active Duty, Guard and Reserve components of the US military are fully integrated in planning, funding, training, organization and equipment is largely a myth. We have three Armies and three Air Forces. Planning is difficult to impossible because the active duty forces see the reserves as a threat to their budget and political influence. Funding is due more to political battles among individual members in Congress than and priority needs of the guard or reserve forces. Equipment purchases are often not budgeted for the reserve components as we have seen. Front-line equipment that is transferred to them is often done so that it can be kept in the inventory rather than put in mothballs. For many in the active forces, it is a form of storage for them, not an upgrade for the Guard or Reserve. But many other units find themselves training on one piece of equipment (M-60 tanks) but with a war time mission to repair or take into battle another (M-1A1 tanks). Training is better because reservists are spending much more time on active duty helping the regular forces accomplish a myriad of OOTW missions. But the organizational structure to maintain this tempo of operations is strained.

Even if these matters were resolved, there is another set of problems which bedevil the relations among the active and reserve component forces. This can best be described as a difference in attitude and acceptability. Among active duty personnel, the guard and reserves simply do not count as professionals. They are seen as amateurs, people to be put up with but not ones who are generally respected as colleagues and fellow professionals. One of the problems which emerged from the Gulf War was a difference in treatment of higher ranking Guard and Reserve officers who were not given command of more junior active duty counterparts so as not to cause problems in morale by having active duty regulars working for part-time guard and reserve commanders. In the past six years working for the US Air Force, I have frequently been introduced to or told about officers in the guard and reserve. Invariably the phrase "he's a Guard guy" is used with a touch of disdain. To be in the reserves is seen as being a second class military citizen--or worse. Those who are seen, unlike their full time uniformed active duty counterparts, as in it for the extra money, not out of any sense of allegiance, loyalty or service. Such is not the reality and these attitudes must be changed if a truly effective Total Force policy is to become a reality..

This situation is ironic in some respects for in annual competitions, personnel in the Air National Guard may often best their active duty counterparts in proficiency. This

is quite simply because personnel in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve have civilian jobs closely related to the part-time military duties, in some cases, synonymous with them. Many are commercial airline pilots or mechanics, air traffic controllers working for the FAA or cargo handling specialists for Federal Express or other air freight companies. They actually spend more time doing their jobs in the civilian world than if they were on active duty. Guard and Reserve pilots may fly twice as much or more than active duty personnel. But while this is true for the Air Force, it is not true for the Army. There are few civilian equivalents for tank gunners, Bradley fighting vehicle drivers or mortar specialist and artillerymen.

Current Objectives, Future Threats and Wars

The US military is being down-sized, reorganized, and, as the military arm of the world's only superpower, finds itself stretched to the limit to perform a myriad of OOTW missions, be prepared to fight and win two nearly simultaneous regional contingencies and assist in domestic missions ranging from education and training in the public schools to disaster relief, environmental clean-up and counter-narcotics operations. Part of this is entirely understandable for when a particular task needs to be done, the military represents a loyal, disciplined, highly trained pool of manpower available to serve the nation. The problem comes about when the nation has little clear understanding of what it is asking the military to do and the priorities that need to be established in order to have some, but not all, of these things done well and consistently. Until the political leadership and the country get a better grip on just what it wants the nation's military to be--the world's policeman, the savior of discipline and values in the inner city, the world's nanny, the protectors of American freedoms and values, the world's only remaining superpower, or the country's premier environmental service corps--we have a problem. The US military simply cannot accomplish all these roles and missions simultaneously for long and do them well while maintaining their combat skills as well.

Every time you deploy and employ troops on a peacekeeping mission, you may assist with the diplomatic agenda of the country and aid in the prevention of further human suffering by retarding if not preventing full scale violence. But simultaneously, you are degrading the combat skills of many of the participants. Americans have flown more sorties in support of PROVIDE COMFORT in northern Iraq than they did in the Gulf War. Similarly with DENY FLIGHT and PROVIDE PROMISE combined in Bosnia. Pilots are generally "boring holes in the sky," not practicing air to air combat or bombing skills. And, to the extent that they do these missions, they are unable to get routine training, conduct required inspections and test the full array of mission competencies which they are required to maintain. Worse, the aircraft are literally being used up. Thousands of hours of a finite airframe life, and significant repair costs and spare parts are being consumed at much higher than normal rates and without either the replacement planes, the funding or the spare parts to compensate fully for these activities. Though Air Force examples, the same can be said of the Army, active as well as guard and reserve, which has spent its time of late guarding Cuban refugees at Guantanamo

Bay, patrolling the streets of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, passing out food in Somalia, patrolling southern borders of the US, and a variety of other specialized duties.

The problem comes when we stretch the active duty forces so thin that they cannot perform the assigned missions without use of the guard and reserve forces. These are anxious, initially, to get into deployments and employments with their active duty brethren. But the length of the deployments, their frequency, and the demands placed upon employers, families, finances, and emotions are great. What would willingly be borne in time of war, is difficult to sustain in peace time. We are caught in the middle as are both the active and reserve component forces of the military. They are doing their best to sustain a variety of tasks that society has asked them to perform but we are not at war. When we have to go to war again, we will find our personnel, equipment, spare parts and abilities greatly degraded by having performed these other missions. We may not be doing ourselves any favors.

Let me be clear about this. We are past the point at which the military was whining their equivalent of "we don't do windows." They are doing the bulk of OOTW missions well, if not entirely gladly. But in "doing windows," they are less ready and able to do war. Society and our political leaders must understand this if we are to avoid reacting to future threats in ways which will make things worse, not better.

OTHER PROBLEMS

Readiness vs. Modernization (vs. Congress)

The traditional problems for militaries throughout the world has been how to balance efforts between being prepared to go to war should that be necessary and spending funds on modernization of weaponry, transportation, communication, etc. The same is true for guard and reserve forces as for the active duty military. But this circumstance is aggravated even more for their is no real way to intelligently plan on how best to do this and to fund a long term strategy for readiness and modernization. As we have seen, Congress adds all the major equipment purchases for the reserves to the defense budget. It also determines the size of the force, usually increasing it by as much as 60,000 people over the DOD request. In that personnel costs constitute the greatest part of a defense budget, this has not insignificant perturbations in reserve and guard planning. Then too, they add 30 to 40 guard and reserve armories or training centers in a given FY defense budget. With everything in flux, it is hard to plan rationally.

Guard and reserve forces seem to perform reasonably well in what the Army classifies as combat support (Signal, Chemical, Military Police, Intelligence, Civil Affairs, Engineer, Psychological Operations, Aviation) and combat service support (Supply and Service, Quartermaster, Transportation, Finance, Administration, Ammunition, Judge Advocate, Petroleum/Water, Railroad, Maintenance, Medical) roles. Where they have greater difficulty in the Army is in Combat roles (Infantry, Armor, Artillery, Special Forces, Combat Engineer and Combat Aviation). Given the need for

ranges, the use of sophisticated and dangerous equipment, live fire of ammunition, coordination of large scale units, and the like for effective training, it is understandable that a reservist in a combat unit (50% of the Army's infantry divisions) might not be as proficient as he should be to face combat with an enemy. In many cases, it takes longer to master proficiency in one's military occupational specialty (MOS) than there are training days in the year for the reservist.

The "Round Out Brigade" concept in which a reserve unit would round out an active duty division when it deployed was filled with controversy during and immediately after the Gulf War. The Army maintained that the three units in question which went into training but were never deployed to the Gulf were not ready while the reserve and guard maintained that they met Army standards and the Army changed the rules in the middle of the game.³⁴ Despite the accuracy of these accounts, there is a difference in the combat skills of reservists and guardsmen and their active duty counterparts, at least in the Army, Navy and Marines, if not the Air Force. Heavy reliance on reserve combat forces does not seem to be prudent. Nor does having all the support functions in the reserves, where most of them are, and having all the combat units in the active forces. It then becomes very difficult if not impossible to any of the OOTW missions without calling reservists to active duty. Therein lies the rub.

OPSTEMPO

OPSTEMPO refers to the number, nature and size of operations being conducted at any one time or over a fixed period of time. This has increased significantly for both active and reserve and guard forces as we have seen above. But the real impact of this increased tempo of operations is difficult to appreciate. The US has drastically increased its support for humanitarian relief efforts and their scope and scale has increased dramatically as well. So too has our support for expanded UN peacekeeping and other peace support operations. If the UN seeks to go somewhere and remain for long, the US will become involved. Though commercial airliners are often chartered to fly troops to a certain location, assuming there is an available airport, their equipment and resupply, food, ammunition, etc. is often done by military carriers. The US has the world's largest fleet of aerial tankers and cargo hauling aircraft and thus generally becomes involved in the operations.

Thus the Gulf War did not end a greatly increased OPSTEMPO for the US military, it merely continued it albeit in different missions. From March 1991 through October 1994, the US has been involved in 27 other overseas deployments.³⁵ These missions ranged from the embassy evacuations in Liberia and Somalia to the evacuation of Clark AFB in the Philippines after the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo, assistance to Bangladesh after devastating typhoon, peace keeping operations in Bosnia, Kuwait and Iraq, refugee handling in Cuba and Haiti, etc. Reserve and Guard forces were involved in most of these and are routinely used in new OOTW missions in a variety of ways.

PERSTEMPO

PERSTEMPO is the military phrase for the impact of personnel assignments and rotations among assignments on readiness and mission capability. Rather than looking at the number and type of operations being conducted at any one time, it is concerned with the perturbations caused in the personnel assignment process and the impact on temporary duty (TDY) assignments as opposed to a permanent change of station (PCS). In that TDY is a status one can only be in for 180 days, and is unaccompanied (no family or government payment for the moving of household goods), there are other implications as well, financial and personnel. Indeed, even among active duty personnel sent on overseas assignment with their families such as at Aviano, Italy where the Air Force flies missions for DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, there are significant family problems related to schooling, medical care, 12 to 18 hour days six days a week for the military member of the family, financial dislocations and psychological stress. One of the major problems of commander commanders abroad is what is known in military parlance as ERDs--Early Return of Dependents. That is a euphemism for divorce and the rate is high and getting higher for both active and reserve forces.

Hearings held by the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on National Security in March, 1995 sought answers to some interesting questions.³⁶ One was, what has been the average number of days on TDY (Temporary Duty) because of increased demands on Reservists to support active duty operations? They also wanted to know what problems this has created. The answers prepared by the services were very revealing. They differ by service but show the same trends. The first is that the active duty forces don't even collect data on reliance on reserve component forces. The Army does not typically support active duty units with USAR by having individuals or units on a TDY status. Rather they assign personnel top Temporary Tours of Active Duty which count against the end strength of the active duty unit. They also use what is called Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW) and Key Personnel Upgrade Program (KPUP). Thus, it is hard to ferret out the exact impact. But on what is reported as TDY and ADSW/KPUP status, the trends are as follows.

	<u>FY 1994</u>	<u>FY 1995</u> ³⁷
ANG Personnel*	248	512
ANG days TDY*	1,960	5,400
USAR (Days in ADSW/KPUP)	25,650	26,000

The * indicates personnel involved in only two programs for EUCOM: State Partnership Program (SPP) and the Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP). The actual number of Army guardsmen and reservists is far larger but counted in the active duty strength of the gaining units.

In the Navy and Marine Corps the circumstances are somewhat different. The average length of a tour on active duty for ADSW in support of active duty operations is 68 days. They did not prepare an answer with the number of personnel involved but maintained it caused no special problems. The Marine Corps, however, reported an average of 5,586 mandays per month in FY 1995 for support of active duty operations. The Marine Corps has the smallest reserve component, per capita and in absolute size of any of the services and yet was dependent to a significant extent on that reserve component. Their statement concluded with the comment that "a fundamental challenge is the requirement to maintain our readiness to meet our traditional combat roles while being responsive to non-traditional missions and taskings."³⁸

The Air Force found the following. The yearly norm for aircrew is 87 days of guard or reserve duty. This is significantly greater than for the other services and include 24 days for unit training assemblies (UTAs), 48 additional flying training periods (AFTPs) and 15 days annual tour (AT)--the two weeks in the summer on active duty status. The average reserve aircrew in FY 1994 exceeded 110 days of duty--26% more than the norm, and more than either their families or their employers had been used to. Indications are, it is growing. Several Guard and Reserve groups I spoke with last spring were on their fifth and sixth 45 day deployment to Incirlik Turkey in support of PROVIDE COMFORT.³⁹ And, at least in the maintenance area, they are working 16 hour days, covering three shifts, seven days a week to get the job done. Sooner or later, we will break the people or the machines, if not both.

CONCLUSIONS

The Current System is Nearly Broken

In an era where the number, type and complexity of military missions are growing, when budgets are becoming more constrained and the military establishment is shrinking in overall size, rational--i.e., apolitical--defense planning becomes a high priority. We are no longer able to afford the waste and inefficiencies of an earlier era, if indeed we ever were. Better planning, programming, and budgeting simply must occur if we are to sustain our level of involvement in world affairs, our military competency and prowess, and the requisite levels of readiness and modernization to support these. Doing business as we do now makes this virtually impossible. While Congress is at the center of many of these dilemmas, an even more fundamental one exists. That is the relationship between American society and its military.

We have had periods of conscription and mass armies in wars, both cold and hot. We have had periods in our history when we relied on a small professional military. But we have never been without a militia, whether it be called the National Guard or the reserves. We have a constitutional connection between the reliance on a "well regulated militia" and the right to keep and bear arms. But we have not taken a fundamental look at the size, nature and type of military establishment that this country needs for the 21st century. If we err to far on one side, we get a very small, highly trained professional

military unconnected to the society which it supposedly represents and one which risks being treated as mercenaries by that society. If we err to far in the other direction, we get a seemingly large conscripted force that may or may not be professional enough to fight and win the high tech wars of the twentieth century.

What we have at the moment is a halfway house which may not be efficient to accomplish the array of tasks that we ask of it. It is not what it purports to be: a total force. And the guard and reserves are in need of a more complete integration in the defense planning and budgeting cycles than is now the case. If not, we will soon find ourselves incapable of performing both OOTW missions and war. This the nation simply cannot permit. But the politics of the situation suggest that we will have to have an internal battle between the active and reserve forces to redraw the lines in order to devise an effective national military strategy.

Public Support & Guard and Reserve Dependency

One of the highlights of our experience in the Gulf War was that public support for the war was in front of the media. It was, despite the hand wringing in Congress up until the final vote to use force in the Gulf if necessary, a popular war. That final vote passed by only five votes in the Senate. A change of three votes would have produced a different outcome despite their being the build up of troops in theater and a dozen UN Security Council Resolutions supporting action against Saddam Hussein and giving a moral and legal underpinning to US actions. This was true in part because so many guard and reserve troops as well as active duty forces were deployed during DESERT SHIELD.

But the Gulf War was also virtually a dream war for the US. It had high tech and low casualties, was of short duration and as bloodless as a war had ever been for this country. If things had been otherwise, a nationwide anti-war movement could have arisen nearly instantly. This is because the more than 225,000 guardsmen and reservists who served in the conflict came from every state in the union and nearly every Congressional district. Reservists, like their volunteer active duty brethren, are not politically and economically insignificant 18 and 19 year olds as was true during Vietnam under conscription. These men and women are from all walks of life, in their 30s and 40s with other jobs, a house and mortgage and children. The impact of high casualties in war might well have resembled the reaction to the 18 rangers who died in Mogadishu. We don't yet know, but it is a possibility that should give us pause.

We are in a position where we as a nation simply must rely on the guard and reserve system we have established. That is not unique. But that we have to do so in peace time as well as when we are at war is. This gives new salience to the role that the guard and reserve forces play and their contribution to national security policy. It should make us even more careful about force structure, funding, organization, training and equipping the guard and reserve forces.

Jointness and the Total Force

One hears much these days about the legacy of Goldwater-Nichols, the 1986 Defense Act which forced the military to re-examine its command and control, how it went to and fought war, to be more "joint" in all it did instead of service specific and parochial. While we may debate the degree to which this has actually happened and the merits and demerits of placing interservice cooperation above service based competency, we should agree that jointness has not gone far enough. The jointness that matters and that few are worried about is less the jointness among the separate services, important though that is. Increasingly, it is more a case of the jointness that is ignored--the jointness between the active and reserve and guard components of the nation's military.

If we don't fix the myriad of problems that exist in the relationship between the nations active duty forces and the reserve and guard components, we will find ourselves incapable of accomplishing the missions the nation seeks for its military to perform. Calling the nation's military "the total force" is a hope, not a reality. Until it is, we have some fundamental weaknesses in our defense establishment. When the active duty military speak and say "we," they mean the active force which they represent or the active duty military writ large. But the "we" to which they refer is in a minority and has been for five years now. And much of the equipment and the tasks that the active duty must rely on to accomplish their missions lie in the reserves. Greater care and attention must be directed toward the majority of our uniformed servicemen--the guard and reserves--and the roles we expect them to play in the future to insure the defense of the nation. We cannot afford to risk incompetence abroad because of disorganization and petty partisan politics at home. The nation deserves better.

NOTES

¹ Wallace Earl Walker, "Comparing Army Reserve Forces: A Tale of Multiple Ironies, Conflicting Realities, and More Certain Prospects," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol 18, No. 3, Spring 1992, p. 311.

² These figures are drawn from *Reserve Component Programs, The FY 1994 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board*, Washington, DC: The Office of the Secretary of Defense, January, 1995, pp. 4-5. This will be cited hereafter as *RCP*. IRR/ING stands for "Individual Ready Reserve" and "inactive National Guard." These refer to those not presently assigned to and drilling with a unit but capable of being called up to do so. They are recently out of the active duty forces or reserves and deemed to be capable of quick insertion into appropriate units.

³ *RCP*, pp. 13, 15, 17, 19.

⁴ *RCP*, pp. 11-28.

⁵ USAF Base and Combined/Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commanders at Aviano, Italy (DENY FLIGHT) and Incirlik, Turkey (PROVIDE COMFORT) stated categorically that they could not perform their missions without personnel and equipment from the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve units on 45 to 90 day rotations. Interviews conducted by the author at each site, 21 March and 28 March 199 respectively.

⁶ *NGA*, p. 94.

⁷ *RCP*, pp. 28-34.

⁸ There are many books that are histories and assessments of the Guard and Reserve and their evolution and problems. Among the better, more current ones and those dated, but considered classics, are the following: Martha Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard university Press, 1965; John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and The National Guard*, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983*, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984; Eliot Cohen, *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemma of Military Service*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1985; Bennie J. Wilson, III (Ed.), *The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force: The First Decade, 1973-1983*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1985; Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, *US Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989; Martin Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993; and Jeffrey A. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers*, Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994.

⁹ *National Guard Almanac, 1995*, Falls Church VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1995, p. 150 hereafter cited as *NGA* and *Reserve Forces Almanac, 1995*, Falls Church, VA: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1995, pp. 157-161, hereafter cited as *RFA*.

¹⁰ *RCP*, p. 105.

¹¹ *RCP*, p. 8.

¹² This story is profiled in an article by Bradley Graham, "Military Reserve Force A Repository for Pork," *Washington Post*, June 25, 1995, pp. 1, ff.

¹³ *RCP*, pp. 105-106.

¹⁴ *RCP*, p.107.

¹⁵ *RCP*, p. 108.

¹⁶ *RCP*, p. 109.

¹⁷ *RCP*, p. 112.

¹⁸ See *RFA*, pp. 161-165.

¹⁹ *RNA*, pp. 100, 150.

²⁰ *RNA*, p. 150.

²¹ For a short description of this, see Lewis Sorley "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters*, XXI, 2 (Summer 1991), pp. 35-50. For a longer version, see his biography of General Abrams entitled *Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1992

²² *RCP*, pp. 15, 22.

²³ See Office of the Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *The Reserve Components of the United States Armed Forces*, Washington, DC, June 1992, Chapter 9, "The Contribution of the Reserve Components to the Persian Gulf War," pp. 38-52.

²⁴ This is the conclusion reached in Marygail Brauner, et al., *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Effectiveness of Total Force Policy During the Persian Gulf Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992, p. 84. Further information about these matters may be found in National Defense Research Institute (RAND), *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992; Leslie Lewis et al., *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1992. See also Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen Soldier Force*, Ch. 5, "Lesson Learned From Desert Storm," pp. 88-104 and James E. Lightfoot, *Mobilizing the Air National Guard for the Persian Gulf War*. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994.

²⁵ See "Cost of Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm and Allied Contributions," Statement of Frank C. Conahan, Assistant Comptroller General, National Security and International Affairs Division, Before the Committee on Budget, House of Representatives, Washington, DC: General Accounting Office, May 15, 1991 (GAO/T-NSIAD-91-34).

²⁶ "Harper's Index," *Harper's Magazine*, May, 1991, p. 17.

²⁷ For information on the range of benefits for members of the Guard and Reserve, see *NGA*, pp. 37-60 and *RFA*, pp. 28-40 and 58-69.

²⁸ *Congressional Record*, 15 July 1992, p. S9099.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ *Congressional Record*, 17 August 1994, p. H8550.

³¹ *Congressional Record*, 9 August, 1994, p. S11002.

³² Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, "DoD Specifies Guard and Reserve Units to Eliminate," new release 114-92, March 26, 1992, cited in Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War?*, p. 136.

³³ House Armed Services Committee, "Bill Promotes Military and Economic Security," news release, October 1, 1992, appendix table cited in Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War*, p. 136.

³⁴ For a discussion of the arguments, see Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War?*, pp. 119-128.

³⁵ For a list of these and the dates of the operations, see the Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Assessment, 1995*, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1995, p. 14.

³⁶ Material provided by Col Bradley Stonesifer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, 15 May, 1995.

³⁷ Materials provided for testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on National Security, 14 March, 1995. Information supplied by Col Stonesifer.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Briefing given by Col Mark Gay, USA, Chief of Staff, CTF PROVIDE COMFORT, Incirlik, Turkey, 28 March 1995 and conversations with various aircrew members assigned to Incirlik.

DESERT STORM WARNINGS

A Book Review by
GRANT T. HAMMOND

Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War

by Robert H. Scales, Jr., et al.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993.
435 pp. \$115.00

The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf

by Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995.
551 pp. \$27.95
[ISBN 0-316-32172-9]


These two books on the Persian Gulf War are radically different. One is the official Army history while the second is a journalistic post-mortem written in the same genre as *Commanders* by Bob Woodward. Although both promise *ground truth*, we are left with very different impressions of what happened and why. They reinforce the maxim that in war, truth is the first casualty. One ignores many questions and failures raised in a host of other works; the other is a more engaging account, the more informative as well as the more useful and important of the two books.

Certain Victory is an odd work. The effort to produce it began shortly after the Gulf War and at least one version, far more critical, was abandoned. General Scales and his team of officers put together a work that is basically operational in focus with far more tactical detail than strategic perspective. Massaged for one year by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, it was pasted together in distinct pieces for various purposes. The senior leader-

ship of the Army got what it wanted, but less than it deserved. The book was not published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History, but under the auspices of the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. In the first chapter and conclusions, the text wallows in effusive prose and shameless self-promotion of Army doctrine and prowess. Elsewhere, it combines aspects of a *Festschrift* in honor of Generals Vuono and Sullivan with vignettes by Bradley drivers, tank gunners, and infantrymen.

Certain Victory purports to describe how revised doctrine as practiced in the Gulf War and the success that training and reequipping after Vietnam brought about. We are treated to reviews of AirLand Battle, the expanded role of realistic training, the "big five" systems (namely, the Abrams, Bradley, Apache, Blackhawk, and Patriot). The Army was radically transformed in the wake of Vietnam. But it would never have undergone that change under the inspiration of books like this.

A host of questions are raised by this book. Some are mentioned, but others are not. Few are assessed in detail. Among those cited are communications problems with older model short-range radios and dependence on satellite communications, difficulties in resupply on the move, and a disinvestment in UAVs. Other issues—such as how we might have supplied the requisite water and POL if had not been in theater already, sustained a longer ground campaign, and dealt with a 28 percent friendly fire rate, or why VI Corps stopped its advance at night if time was critical and the inability to adapt rapidly to changing battlefield conditions—are not. The chapter describing the attack on the Iraqis is entitled "The Great Wheel." Both the name and the reality strongly question doctrinal commitment to agility and initiative. Phase lines and synchronization rule all along with lousy weather, an enormous appetite for fuel and ammunition, and poor communications.



U.S. Air Force (Dean W. Wagner)

The general tone of *Certain Victory* is more like cheerleading than careful analysis. Sadly, demonstrating success by the destruction of weapons (a variation on the body count as a measure of merit) cannot camouflage the fact that we won a battle, not a war. Iraq was expelled and the government of Kuwait restored. But neither the Republican Guard nor Saddam's WMD capability was destroyed. Despite the changes showcased by the Gulf War in *Certain Victory*, one is struck by the verities of continuity. Time, terrain, and weather were greater obstacles than the Iraqis.

The complete destruction of the Republican Guard was identified by General Schwarzkopf as the "main operational objective." One gets the impression that if destruction of the Republican Guard is repeated often enough, the reader will ignore the reality that it was not destroyed. Despite Schwarzkopf's assurance to the media in the briefing at the end of the war that "the gate is closed" and the Republican Guard could not escape, that was not true and at least half of it did. VII Corps did not occupy Safwan, the site selected for cease fire negotiations, much to the embarrassment of all concerned. The somewhat disingenuous epigraph to *Certain Victory* is a quote from Sun Tzu's *Art of War*: "In war, then, let our great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns." We had a short campaign, but we did not get a usable victory—no better peace but rather a *status quo ante bellum*.

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The Generals' War is written by the military correspondent for *The New York Times* and a retired Marine three-star general. It pulls few punches and draws sweeping conclusions worthy of further assessment. The authors tell us that jointness is largely a myth—that each service planned and fought its own war in its own way. While the services developed their own plans, a lack of careful monitoring, according to Gordon and Trainor, caused problems later in the war. During the planning process, we overestimated our enemy, likely casualties, needs, and effectiveness right to the end of the war. Perhaps this is a legacy of the Cold War—the inflation of threats, budgets, and capabilities is a hard habit of mind to break.

A good deal of the book is based on interviews and privileged, even classified information. The authors give vivid insights into the personalities of Powell, Schwarzkopf, Horner, Glosson, Waller, Franks, McCaffrey, Yeosock, and others, and also vignettes on debates, temper tantrums, disputes, and briefings that occurred during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Powell seems more the politician and even pacifist than one might expect. They also document that as good as the air campaign was, it had many flaws. Discriminate warfare through airpower worked better in theory than in practice.

On the significance of the Battle of Khafji, a key element of the book, the authors stretch the evidence to make their point. They claim that the two-day series of border engagements at the end of January was the “defining moment in the Persian Gulf War.” They argue that this was both tactical and strategic and designed to cause American casualties in large numbers, that Schwarzkopf failed to grasp what it signified about Iraqi capabilities, and that in failing to revise his plans, Khafji set the stage for the escape of the Republican Guard one month later. This has appeal but to infer that an accurate assessment of the Iraqi army and its fighting skills could have been drawn at the time seems to rely more on hindsight than

logic. It certainly was not, as they entitle the chapter, “The Mother of All Battles.”

The threatened Marine amphibious attack on Kuwait is rightly characterized as “deception by default.” But the change in plans for an attack from the south—which required reconstituting a huge logistics base in a new position, planning of a new axis of advance, etc.—showed skill and ingenuity. The attack, once launched, proceeded faster and more effectively than anticipated. The success of the Marines was one of the reasons for the discontinuity and mistiming of the left hook. What failed in a basic sense was the very concept of synchronization so cherished by the Army. The coordination of the ground war and the difficulties encountered fall at the feet of Schwarzkopf who was dual hatted as CINC and the ground component commander—and who was positioned 300 miles to the rear of the initial FEBA.

The plan developed to trap and destroy the Republican Guard, the major military objective, was flawed from the outset. The distances, fuel and ammunition consumption rates, and such were known well in advance. The pace of the advance to various phase lines was carefully calculated. Gordon and Trainor go further. The Army plan to destroy the Republican Guard was designed to take seven to ten days but got less than five. Even then the pace could have been faster. VII Corps synchronized the advance to its slowest unit and stopped at night. Still worse, General Franks, the major ground force combat commander in contact, spoke directly with Schwarzkopf only once during the ground war. Though the hundred hour war was in many ways a public relations gambit (shorter than Israel's Six Day War, Schwarzkopf quipped), the general retreat of Iraqi forces began only 39 hours after the main attack. Phase line “Victory” was 27 miles from Basra and the main highway north, but it was to be the limit of advance. VII Corps turned east too quickly and then stopped too soon.

As Schwarzkopf presented his famous “Mother of All Briefings” assuring the press and the world that “the gate is closed,” it was apparent to field commanders that the bulk of the Republican Guard was being allowed to escape. Instead of peace, we gained a truce of indeterminate duration. Although General Waller, deputy CINC, told Schwarzkopf “You have got to be bullshitting me” when informed of the decision, no one seriously questioned, let alone challenged it. Deployments on the ground were unknown, the site selected for negotiations was not in coalition hands, and no serious discussion of war termination criteria had occurred. We just stopped and declared victory.

What Gordon and Trainor show is that many flag officers are hide-bound, risk averse, and unable to give or accept constructive criticism. They command by virtue of rank and temperament. Schwarzkopf's tirades were so well known that most felt lucky to survive briefings in his presence unscathed, rather than saying what perhaps should have been said. Work-arounds were devised for personalities as well as problems and each deferred to those of higher rank without a full brief for opposing opinions. Everyone burnished his own record. In that sense, the book is perfectly titled for it shows much of the infighting, attitudes, tirades, and problems of a generals' war.

The book takes the services to task for not candidly assessing their respective performances and for publicly ignoring many problems which they encountered. All sought to take advantage of the war to showcase their prowess and get favorable publicity. They also ducked major problems in their self-assessments. Such criticisms is needed in order to avoid a “Gulf War Syndrome” of undeserved praise and success that could be every bit as destructive as the “Vietnam Syndrome” of defeat and demoralization.

Unfounded, at times unbounded, puffery and self-promotion bespeak a tendency that is a tragic flaw in much of the American military. That flaw is the general re-

luctance to accept criticism and, more importantly, the inability to make objective self-assessments. This is highlighted by a comment Schwarzkopf made to a meeting of the Marine high command after the war.

Watch out what you say. Why do I say that? Because we have people interviewing everyone they can get their hands on. They are out writing their books. Just think of the reputation of the United States military, what it is today, compared to what it was six months ago. I think we ought to be very proud of what we did here, and don't allow those bastards to rob us of that.

Such an attitude does a disservice to the Nation. So too does a presumption that patriots come only in uniforms.

Writing military history is not a stale academic enterprise, nor should it be a public relations ploy. Accounts of what happened—both how and why—depend on the context of the times, the perspectives taken, the evidence available, and the skill of the authors. No one work contains the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. But the effort to distill as much as possible from an examination of the past is vitally important to our present understanding and future capabilities. As General Sir William Butler reminded us, "The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find its fighting done by fools and its thinking done by cowards." We can ill afford either.

JRQ

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SQUARING THE PENTAGON

A Book Review by
WILLIAM H. GREGORY

Reinventing the Pentagon: How the New Public Management Can Bring Institutional Renewal

by Fred Thompson and L.R. Jones
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers,
1994.

298 pp. \$29.95
[ISBN 1-55542-710-3]

The title *Reinventing the Pentagon* seizes on a current all-purpose buzz word epitomized by Vice President Gore's report on reengineering the Federal bureaucracy and a movement sweeping local and state government to improve efficiency. Yet the authors, both academics, do not attempt to reinvent the Pentagon in the synoptic sense, starting with force structure or roles and missions. Rather their summons to restructure, not simply deregulate, focuses on narrower, specific areas: the reinvention of defense budgeting, the relationship between DOD and Congress, the acquisition process, and defense accounting. Nonetheless, their approach is valuable. They raise prickly issues about the effectiveness of DOD administration. Is the defense establishment overstaffed now that the Cold War is over? They think that it is—and was long before the demise of the Soviet Union.

A proxy for the book's thesis comes in its story of Germany and France after World War I. Under of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forced to cut military spending, reduce its officer corps to one-fifteenth of its pre-war size, and scrap its weapons and equipment. Although France outspent Germany on defense in the next two decades, Germany was more selective in its

military leadership, more versatile, imaginative, and rigorous in training, and more dependent on research, development, and new weapons because it lacked old ones. The bloated French military structure collapsed in mere months in 1940 under the onslaught of a leaner and better trained German force.

Is there a parallel between France and Germany after World War I and the United States at the end of the Cold War? The authors say there is and have a point. Acquisition, a perennial source of horror stories, is dissected once more in their answer.

The systems command of every service is huge. And, according to Thompson and Jones, their personnel are chronically underemployed. Micromanaged by Congress, organizational bloat leads them to more controls and paperwork for industry—at greater cost. Myriad factions in these organizations are able to participate at each point in the government where a project can be vetoed. To keep everyone on board a given project, all potential participants are given a piece of the action. Requirements proliferate, driven by diverse doctrines and interests. The net result is the spinning out of extravagant operational requirements, gold-plated designs, and unnecessary elaboration of subsystems by the functions responsible for them.

Acquisition is only one splinter in a larger plank. Going back to the origin of the problem, the authors charge that DOD has never clarified administrative boundaries and has not resolved the issue of centralization versus decentralization. Instead, the Pentagon alternated between delegating authority to the military departments and centralizing it in the hands of the Secretary of Defense.

Unlike the success of the Strategic Air Command which had a sharply defined mission and resources, DOD got off on the wrong foot. Unification initially was ill-defined and management policy swung back and forth like a pendulum. Then Robert S. McNamara super-centralized the military. While

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